Security & architecture

No badge wall.
Here's the actual architecture.

We can't hand you a SOC 2 report for your deployment, because your deployment isn't ours to audit. What we can do is publish how the system works, what's encrypted where, and what we can and cannot see. All of it on this page, with no form in front of it.

The core argument

It runs inside the environment you already had audited.

A self-hosted PBX doesn't add a new vendor to your data-processing register. Your calls terminate on your server, your recordings sit in your bucket, your CDRs live in the system's own Postgres on your disk. The compliance surface is your own infrastructure, which your auditors have already seen.

the self-hosted data path. real components, real ports
Per-leg encryption, stated exactly

Where the audio actually goes.

Browser softphone legs run WebRTC with DTLS-SRTP: encrypted media between the browser and your server, with ICE-Lite for traversal.

The control plane (signalling between components, and the admin API) runs over TLS, with the internal media protocol carried on QUIC.

Desk-phone legs on your LAN are standard RTP on your own network, the same as every on-premise PBX ever sold. In a self-hosted deployment that traffic never touches the internet.

The sentence most vendors won't write: if you register a SIP handset across the public internet, put it on your VPN. We say that in the docs, plainly, rather than letting you assume something we didn't build.

Authentication is SIP Digest (MD5 and SHA-256) with realm-correct enforcement, and STIR/SHAKEN call identity on trunks that support it.

What phones home

The complete outbound inventory.

"We can see nothing" is the kind of absolute that deserves suspicion, so here is the scoped version instead.

Media pathno phone-home
Call signallingyour network only
Licence validationlocal · Ed25519-signed file · no licence server callback
Automatic update daemonnone · updates are pulls you run
Crash or usage telemetry in the media planenone
Hosted tierwe operate the box · export is documented

This is a topology you can check, not a policy you have to trust. Put tcpdump on the box and watch.

Key custody

Who holds which keys.

SIP credentialshashed per-realm, in your database
TLS certificatesissued and held on your box (Caddy), or yours via nginx
DTLS-SRTP session keysnegotiated per call, never stored
Recording encryptionAES-256-GCM under a dedicated recording key, isolated from other key material, held on your box
Licence public keyembedded in the binary; your licence file is Ed25519-signed
Tenant isolationrow-level security enforced in the database
Practices

What we do on our side.

Secrets fail closedno secret, no boot
Emergency calling never licence-gatedhard-coded
Migrations are immutable once shippedCI-enforced
Cross-tenant access regression-tested in CIIDOR gate

Certifications for the hosted tier are on the roadmap. We'll publish auditor and dates when engaged, not logos before then. A claim you can't verify yet is a claim we won't print.

Disclosure

Found something?

Report vulnerabilities to [email protected]. A human engineer reads that inbox. We acknowledge within two business days, keep you informed, and credit you if you want credit.

Please don't test against systems you don't own. That's what the free self-hosted tier is for.

Questions an auditor would ask? Ask them.